Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz

American Journal of Political Science, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, 427-444

Abstract: We contend that, with a suitably broad notion of rationality and a diverse set of motivations, the game‐theoretic tradition is particularly well suited for generating insights about effects of deliberative institutions and that progress in the development of deliberative democratic theory hinges on making proper sense of the relationship between game‐theoretic and normative theoretic approaches to deliberation. To advance this view, we explore the central methodological issues at the core of that relationship and address the arguments raised against the relevance of game‐theoretic work on deliberation. We develop a framework for thinking about the differences in how the normative and the game‐theoretic approaches frame and answer questions about deliberation and articulate an approach to a deliberative democratic theory that builds on the strengths of both of these theoretic traditions, properly informed by empirical scholarship.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00379.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:427-444

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