Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?

Donald Wittman

American Journal of Political Science, 2009, vol. 53, issue 3, 588-602

Abstract: This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:3:p:588-602

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