Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending

David M. Primo and James M. Snyder, Jr.

American Journal of Political Science, 2010, vol. 54, issue 2, 354-370

Abstract: “Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive spending because of a decreased incentive to secure a “personal vote” via local projects. We estimate that spending in states with strong party organizations is at least 4% smaller than in states where parties are weak. We also find evidence that strong party states receive less federal aid than states with weak organizations, and we theorize that this is because members of Congress from strong party states feel less compelled to secure aid than members from weak party states.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00435.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:354-370

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