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Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

Jon Eguia

American Journal of Political Science, 2011, vol. 55, issue 1, 16-26

Abstract: In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.

Date: 2011
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