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Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators

Daniel M. Butler and David E. Broockman

American Journal of Political Science, 2011, vol. 55, issue 3, 463-477

Abstract: We use a field experiment to investigate whether race affects how responsive state legislators are to requests for help with registering to vote. In an email sent to each legislator, we randomized whether a putatively black or white alias was used and whether the email signaled the sender's partisan preference. Overall, we find that putatively black requests receive fewer replies. We explore two potential explanations for this discrimination: strategic partisan behavior and the legislators’ own race. We find that the putatively black alias continues to be differentially treated even when the emails signal partisanship, indicating that strategic considerations cannot completely explain the observed differential treatment. Further analysis reveals that white legislators of both parties exhibit similar levels of discrimination against the black alias. Minority legislators do the opposite, responding more frequently to the black alias. Implications for the study of race and politics in the United States are discussed.

Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00515.x

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