Information Exchange in Policy Networks

Philip Leifeld and Volker Schneider

American Journal of Political Science, 2012, vol. 56, issue 3, 731-744

Abstract: Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00580.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:731-744

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