Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats

Taehee Whang, Elena V. McLean and Douglas W. Kuberski

American Journal of Political Science, 2013, vol. 57, issue 1, 65-81

Abstract: This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second mechanism underscores the direct impact of common interest between the two countries and explains the success of sanction threats by the targeted country's greater dependence on this link between the two countries and the sanctioner's ability to exploit this dependence. We test the hypotheses using a new strategic structural estimator. Our results provide no evidence in favor of the informational hypothesis, while lending robust support for the coercive hypothesis.

Date: 2013
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:57:y:2013:i:1:p:65-81

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