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Identifying Irregularities in Mexican Local Elections

Francisco Cantú

American Journal of Political Science, 2014, vol. 58, issue 4, 936-951

Abstract: A generalized distrust in Mexican local elections raises the question of whether electoral corruption has vanished or remains a prevalent practice in the country. To answer this question, I analyze the 2010 gubernatorial elections, exploiting a feature of the country's electoral system: within each electoral precinct, voters are assigned to polling stations according to their childhood surname. Consequently, the only difference between voters in contiguous polling stations should be their last names. Given that political preferences are seldom correlated with voters' names, I use suspicious differences in turnout levels across contiguous polling stations to identify fraudulent practices. The findings of this article indicate that nondemocratic enclaves that actively obstruct the completion of Mexico's democratic transition still remain today.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12097

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