Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations

Daniel Diermeier, Carlo Prato and Razvan Vlaicu

American Journal of Political Science, 2015, vol. 59, issue 4, 866-879

Abstract: A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. In the model, a risk‐averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency (i.e., reduce the procedural uncertainty of free‐for‐all bargaining). An equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive, generating nonmajoritarian policy bias. Still, a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:866-879

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