Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover

Daniel Treisman

American Journal of Political Science, 2015, vol. 59, issue 4, 927-942

Abstract: While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:927-942

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