Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory

Joshua D. Kertzer and Ryan Brutger

American Journal of Political Science, 2016, vol. 60, issue 1, 234-249

Abstract: According to a growing tradition in International Relations, one way governments can credibly signal their intentions in foreign policy crises is by creating domestic audience costs: leaders can tie their hands by publicly threatening to use force since domestic publics punish leaders who say one thing and do another. We argue here that there are actually two logics of audience costs: audiences can punish leaders both for being inconsistent (the traditional audience cost), and for threatening to use force in the first place (a belligerence cost). We employ an experiment that disentangles these two rationales, and turn to a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology to bring the audience into audience cost theory. Our results suggest that traditional audience cost experiments may overestimate how much people care about inconsistency, and that the logic of audience costs (and the implications for crisis bargaining) varies considerably with the leader's constituency.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:60:y:2016:i:1:p:234-249

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