When Are Monetary Policy Preferences Egocentric? Evidence from American Surveys and an Experiment

David H. Bearce and Kim‐Lee Tuxhorn

American Journal of Political Science, 2017, vol. 61, issue 1, 178-193

Abstract: This article enters the international/comparative political economy debate about whether individual‐level macroeconomic policy preferences are egocentric and, if so, on what basis (factors, sectors, or firms). It argues that contextual information may function as a precondition for the emergence of egocentric preferences. With a focus on the trade‐off between using monetary policy for a domestic or an international goal, it presents evidence from three original American surveys using informative vignettes to show how monetary policy preferences exhibit firm‐based egocentric variation: Individuals whose employer does most of its business in overseas markets have a lesser preference for domestic monetary autonomy. It also presents evidence from a survey experiment to show how the strength of this egocentric relationship depends on the informative power of the vignette: A more contextually informative vignette produces a stronger relationship between overseas business activity and a preference against domestic monetary autonomy.

Date: 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12203

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:1:p:178-193

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