Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third‐Party Influence on Protests and Repression

Olga V. Chyzh and Elena Labzina

American Journal of Political Science, 2018, vol. 62, issue 2, 312-324

Abstract: Ukraine's anti‐government protests in 2013–2014, and the ensuing removal of President Yanukovich, raised much speculation about Russia's role in the outcome of the crisis, as well as more general questions related to third‐party influence on domestic protests and repression. Does third‐party assistance to the government increase the level of government repression or deter protesters? Does the leader removal indicate that foreign involvement was a failure? Or can a third party gain from involvement, even if its protégé leader is removed from power? We model external influence on the onset of protests and repression as a game between the government, the protesters, and a third party that supports the government. The main finding is that a third party may “bankroll” repression against the protesters, even at the risk of the removal of their protégé leader, with the goal of deterring future protests within its sphere of interest.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:2:p:312-324

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