Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals

Brandon K. Yoder

American Journal of Political Science, 2019, vol. 63, issue 1, 130-145

Abstract: Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last‐ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12395

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:63:y:2019:i:1:p:130-145

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