Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Janet M. Box‐Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson and Alison W. Craig

American Journal of Political Science, 2019, vol. 63, issue 1, 163-180

Abstract: Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well‐connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:63:y:2019:i:1:p:163-180

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