Food safety, reputation, and regulation

John Bovay

Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2023, vol. 45, issue 2, 684-704

Abstract: This article reviews the empirical economics literature on food safety, reputation, and regulation. Producers have strong private incentives to provide safe food, largely related to reputation, especially the negative demand effects seen in response to food‐safety problems. Mandatory disclosure of information about food safety can change demand and improve safety outcomes. Private incentives led producers and marketers to adopt private and collective standards for produce safety prior to the implementation of similar government regulations in the United States. Private and collective standards and government regulations all have distributional effects. The article concludes with some policy suggestions informed by the literature.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13315

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:apecpp:v:45:y:2023:i:2:p:684-704

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