Monopoly extraction of an exhaustible resource with two markets
Carolyn Fischer and
Ramanan Laxminarayan
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2004, vol. 37, issue 1, 178-188
Abstract:
Abstract. Although much has been written about monopoly extraction of natural resources, the case of a resource being sold in two separate markets has escaped notice. We find that a monopolist facing two different iso‐elastic demand schedules extracts more rapidly than the social planner, whether or not arbitrage prevents price discrimination between markets. JEL classification: D42, Q3 Extraction monopoliste d’une ressource épuisable quand il y a deux marchés. Même si l’on a écrit beaucoup à propos de l’extraction monopoliste de ressources naturelles épuisables, il semble que le cas d’une ressource vendue dans deux marchés séparés n’a pas été traité. On découvre qu’un monopoleur faisant face à deux cédules de demande iso‐élastiques différentes extrait la ressource plus rapidement que le planificateur social, que l’arbitrage entre les marchés empêche ou non la discrimination par les prix.
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.009_1.x
Related works:
Journal Article: Monopoly extraction of an exhaustible resource with two markets (2004) 
Working Paper: Monopoly Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource with Two Markets (2004) 
Working Paper: Monopoly Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource with Two Markets (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:1:p:178-188
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