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The returns from rent‐seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment

Benjamin Liebman and Kara M. Reynolds

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2006, vol. 39, issue 4, 1345-1369

Abstract: Abstract This is the first empirical study to examine Congressional support of a new law that distributes antidumping duties to protected firms. Because the law produces a transparent measure of how much each firm was rewarded for its efforts to secure the bill's passage, it provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the link between the expected financial returns to firms, campaign contributions, and Congressional behaviour. Our results indicate that campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law, while contributions from the law's beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive. Ceci est la première étude empirique examinant le support par le Congrès américain d'une nouvelle loi qui distribue les droits anti‐dumping collectés aux entreprises protégées. Parce que la loi produit une mesure transparente de la récompense versée à une entreprise pour ses efforts de lobbying afin de s'assurer que la loi est mise en vigueur, cela permet aux chercheurs d'étudier le lien entre les rendements financiers anticipés pour les entreprises, leurs contributions aux campagnes électorales, et les actions du Congrès. Les résultats indiquent que les contributions aux campagnes électorales en provenance des bénéficiaires potentiels accroissent la probabilité que les législateurs vont supporter la loi, et que les contributions en provenance des bénéficiaires de la loi s'accroissent à proportion que la taille de la récompense anticipée s'accroît.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2006.00392.x

Related works:
Journal Article: The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment (2006)
Working Paper: The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment (2004) Downloads
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