Information and Strategic Political Polarisation
Juan D. Carrillo and
Micael Castanheira
Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 118, issue 530, 845-874
Abstract:
We develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality. Policy positions are observed and, during the campaign, the press reveals some information about quality. We demonstrate that when information is imperfect, the Black‐Downs median voter theorem fails to hold. For intermediate information levels, the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter's bliss point. By contrast, convergence to the median occurs when quality is (almost) always or (almost) never revealed. We also show that a profit‐maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal.
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02152.x
Related works:
Journal Article: Information and Strategic Political Polarisation (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:530:p:845-874
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://onlinelibrary ... 1111/(ISSN)1468-0297
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton
More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().