Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – An Experimental Investigation

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm

Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, issue 537, 855-882

Abstract: We present laboratory experiments of five different multi‐unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed‐bid uniform‐price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed‐bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x

Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation (2009)
Working Paper: Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:537:p:855-882

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://onlinelibrary ... 1111/(ISSN)1468-0297

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().