Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality

Roland Strausz

Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, issue 540, 1405-1421

Abstract: Stressing the multi‐dimensional character of quality, I propose a new theory of planned obsolescence as an incentive device that benefits consumers. I argue that planned obsolescence increases the frequency of repurchases and, therefore, enables consumers to punish producers faster for a lack of overall quality. This strengthens the producers’ incentives to provide adequate levels of quality. The theory implies a trade‐off between a good's durability and its other unobservable quality attributes. This leads to an artificially high degree of obsolescence as compared to the first best where quality is observable.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02290.x

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Journal Article: Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality (2009)
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