Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo () and Paolo Vanin

Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 125, issue 586, F175-F202

Abstract: With weak law†enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources may increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, favouring the emergence of mafia†type organisations. We test this hypothesis by investigating the emergence of the mafia in twentieth century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property†rights enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Using historical data on the early incidence of mafia activity and on the distribution of sulphur reserves, we document that the mafia was more present in municipalities with greater sulphur availability.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (113)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12236

Related works:
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2015)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2015)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2012)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2012)
Working Paper: Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the origins of the Sicilian mafia (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:econjl:v:125:y:2015:i:586:p:f175-f202

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://onlinelibrary ... 1111/(ISSN)1468-0297

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().