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Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians

Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne

Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 127, issue 605, F495-F517

Abstract: We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election‐winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents' municipality to work.

Date: 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12494

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Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton

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