A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Marek Pycia and Peter Troyan

Econometrica, 2023, vol. 91, issue 4, 1495-1526

Abstract: We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade‐off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16310

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Working Paper: A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design (2022)
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