Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis

Cary Deck, Paul Pecorino () and Michael Solomon

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2024, vol. 21, issue 2, 244-278

Abstract: The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium possible when there are no NEV suits breaks down because plaintiffs with NEV suits do not have a credible threat to proceed to trial, which undermines the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits is not found to cause the signaling equilibrium to unravel or to cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only drop NEV lawsuits three‐fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semi‐pooling range remains unchanged.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12382

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Working Paper: Litigation with Negative Expected Value Suits: An Experimental Analysis (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:21:y:2024:i:2:p:244-278

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