Constraints on Compliance and the Impact of Health Information in Rural Pakistan
Daniel Bennett (),
Syed Ali Asjad Naqvi () and
Health Economics, 2015, vol. 24, issue 9, 1065-1081
The provision of information, which is a common public health strategy, may be ineffective if recommendations are not privately optimal for message recipients. This paper evaluates the response to a hygiene information campaign in rural Pakistan. In a theoretical model, baseline hygiene and health proxy for preferences, prices, and wealth, which jointly moderate the impact of information. We show that people with good baseline hygiene and health respond differentially to the hygiene message. This result, which does not appear to arise through differential learning, suggests that practical constraints limit the adoption of hygiene recommendations. Information provision may exacerbate health inequality under these conditions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:24:y:2015:i:9:p:1065-1081
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