Paying patients to comply: an economic analysis

Antonio Giuffrida and Hugh Gravelle

Health Economics, 1998, vol. 7, issue 7, 569-579

Abstract: A significant proportion of patients do not complete prescribed treatment or do not follow medical advice. There is evidence that financial incentives can increase compliance. We present a model of patient compliance and use it to examine the circumstances in which patients should be paid to comply with treatment and discuss the factors determining the optimal level of payment to patients. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(1998110)7:73.0.CO;2-S

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:7:y:1998:i:7:p:569-579

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