THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY

Antoine Bommier and Stéphane Zuber

International Economic Review, 2012, vol. 53, issue 2, 593-608

Abstract: The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgments. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degrees of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time‐consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00693.x

Related works:
Working Paper: The Pareto principle of optimal inequality (2009)
Working Paper: The Pareto Principle of Optimal Inequality (2009)
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