The Pareto Principle of Optimal Inequality

Antoine Bommier and Stéphane Zuber

No 09-132, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgements. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degress of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails.

Keywords: inequality aversion; Pareto principle; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/ipdm/wp_ipdm_132_2009.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY (2012)
Working Paper: The Pareto principle of optimal inequality (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:22253

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().