EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

BUYING LOCALLY

George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson

International Economic Review, 2016, vol. 57, issue 4, 1179-1200

Abstract: ‘‘Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another instead of the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I'll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements and are often championed on social or environmental grounds. We show that in a monopolistically competitive economy, buy local arrangements can have salutary effects even for selfish agents immune to social or environmental considerations. Buy local arrangements effectively allow firms to exploit the equilibrium price–cost gap to profitably expand their sales at the going price.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12194

Related works:
Working Paper: Buying Locally (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Buying Locally (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Buying Locally (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:4:p:1179-1200

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:4:p:1179-1200