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Buying Locally

George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics, Yale University

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: “Buy local†arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another rather than the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I’ll buy from you if you buy from me†arrangements, and are often championed on social or environmental grounds. We show that in a monopolistically competitive economy, buy local arrangements can have salutary effects even for selfish agents immune to social or environmental considerations. Buy local arrangements effectively allow firms to exploit the equilibrium price-cost gap to profitably expand their sales at the going price.

Keywords: Buy local; local currency; trading favors; reciprocity; monopolistic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D85 L14 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015-03-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: BUYING LOCALLY (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Buying Locally (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Buying Locally (2015) Downloads
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