RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange and Rachel Kranton

International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 2, 421-448

Abstract: This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12275

Related works:
Working Paper: Rumors and social networks (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and social networks (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and Social Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Rumors and Social Networks (2014)
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