MULTIPERIOD MATCHING

Sangram V. Kadam and Maciej Kotowski

International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 4, 1927-1947

Abstract: We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12324

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Working Paper: Multi-period Matching (2015)
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