Multi-period Matching

Sangram Kadam and Maciej Kotowski

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We examine a dynamic, multi-period, bilateral matching market, such as a labor market where workers are long-lived and production occurs over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching. Our framework accommodates many forms of inter-temporal preference complementarities, including a taste for variety and a status-quo bias. Extensions of our model incorporating imperfect information and financial transfers are proposed. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: MULTIPERIOD MATCHING (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp15-030

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