RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT

David K. Levine and Cesar Martinelli

International Economic Review, 2024, vol. 65, issue 4, 1607-1624

Abstract: We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead of exclusively costly incentives as in nonclose elections. We show that, under those conditions, better voter targeting results in tighter races and increased turnout. Furthermore, the smaller party often has a strong incentive to commit to strategies that ensure a close election.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12711

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Working Paper: Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout (2024)
Working Paper: Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout (2024)
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