Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout

David Levine and Cesar Martinelli

No 18807, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Abstract We argue that standard models of voting do a bad job explaining the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. We instead model head-to-head elections as a competition between incentive schemes to turn out voters and elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections in which voters are motivated by pivotality rather than providing voters with costly incentives to turn out in an election that is not close. When this is the case, we show that better targeting of voters results in closer votes and higher turnouts and that the smaller of the two parties has a strong incentive to engage in commitment that will drive a close election.

Date: 2024-02
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Journal Article: RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT (2024)
Working Paper: Razor-Thin Mass Elections with High Turnout (2024)
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