NONSTANDARD CHOICE IN MATCHING MARKETS
Gian Caspari and
Manshu Khanna
International Economic Review, 2025, vol. 66, issue 2, 757-786
Abstract:
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate nonstandard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive‐compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well‐functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate nonstandard choice behavior.
Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12734
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:66:y:2025:i:2:p:757-786
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