Non-standard choice in matching markets

Gian Caspari and Manshu Khanna ()

No 22-054, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior that is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.

Keywords: Matching Theory; Market Design; Stability; College Admissions Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D47 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/266644/1/1824559976.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22054

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