Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks

Hans Gersbach and Bernhard Pachl

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2009, vol. 41, issue 2‐3, 507-516

Abstract: We propose a flexible majority rule for central‐bank committees where the size of the majority depends monotonically on the change in interest rate within a particular time frame. Small changes in the interest rate require a small share, while larger changes require a larger share of supporting votes. We show that flexible majority rules are superior to simple majority rules.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00218.x

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Journal Article: Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks (2009)
Working Paper: Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:2-3:p:507-516

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