 Regulations and Productivity Growth in Banking: Evidence from Transition EconomiesManthos Delis (), Philip Molyneux () and Fotios Pasiouras Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, vol. 43, issue 4, 735-764 Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the regulatory and supervision framework, and the productivity of banks in 22 countries over the period 1999–2009. We follow a semiparametric two‐step approach that combines Malmquist index estimates with bootstrap regressions. The results indicate that regulations and incentives that promote private monitoring (PMON) have a positive impact on productivity. Restrictions on banks’ activities relating to their involvement in securities, insurance, real estate, and ownership of nonfinancial firms also have a positive impact. Regulations relating to the first and second pillars of Basel II, namely, capital requirements (CAPR) and official supervisory power (SPR) do not have, in general, a statistically significant impact on productivity over the study period although they appear to gain in importance following the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The latter finding indicates that stringent capital and supervisory standards have positive productivity effects when financial pressures peak. Our results are robust when controlling for various country‐specific features and alternative estimation approaches. Date: 2011 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:4:p:735-764 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing |
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