Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation

Guillermo Vuletin and Ling Zhu

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, vol. 43, issue 6, 1185-1215

Abstract: This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00422.x

Related works:
Journal Article: Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:6:p:1185-1215

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().