A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks
Jonathan Chiu and
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2013, vol. 45, issue 2‐3, 327-347
Payment and settlement networks typically involve various tiers of intermediation. This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of tiered settlement networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent (CA) failure. We offer two explanations for tiering: private information regarding participant’s credit worthiness and economies of scale in the participation in the settlement system. CAs play a monitoring and cost‐saving role in the settlement network. As a result, a failure of a CA can lead to a large and persistent welfare loss to the economy.
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Journal Article: A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks (2013)
Working Paper: A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i:2-3:p:327-347
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