The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

Allen N. Berger, Bjorn Imbierowicz and Christian Rauch

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2016, vol. 48, issue 4, 729-770

Abstract: We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (122)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12316

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Working Paper: The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:48:y:2016:i:4:p:729-770

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