Economics at your fingertips  

The Legacy and the Tyranny of Time: Exit and Re‐Entry of Sovereigns to International Capital Markets

Luca Agnello, Vitor Castro () and Ricardo Sousa ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2018, vol. 50, issue 8, 1969-1994

Abstract: We use a continuous‐time Weibull model (without and) with a change‐point in duration dependence to investigate the duration of the exit and re‐entry of sovereigns to international markets. We find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episodes are more likely to end—the “legacy of time.” Debtor countries take advantage of the “benefit of doubt” of creditors during short exits. When exits are long and the reputation as a bad borrower emerges, no more “complacency” makes it more difficult to borrow again in international markets—the “tyranny of time.”

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2019-10-14
Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:50:y:2018:i:8:p:1969-1994