Nonlinear Pricing and the Market for Settling Payments

Adam Copeland and Rodney Garratt

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2019, vol. 51, issue 1, 195-226

Abstract: Fedwire Funds is a real‐time gross settlement system that uses a decreasing block pricing scheme to attract nonurgent payments. A bank's optimal response to Fedwire's pricing depends on its perceived benefits to settling nonurgent payments quickly. If the urgency for immediate settlement is great enough, a bank responds to marginal price; otherwise, it responds to average price. We find banks respond to average price, suggesting that Fedwire's advantage over competing services of being able to provide immediate settlement is small. Moreover, attempts to increase demand for Fedwire services by lowering the cost of banks' final block of payments may be ineffective if there is not a corresponding decrease in average cost.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12553

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:51:y:2019:i:1:p:195-226

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