A Note on Simple Strategic Bargaining for Models of Money or Credit
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2019, vol. 51, issue 2-3, 739-754
Many papers on liquidity have bilateral trade with buyers constrained by their money holdings or debt limits. Axiomatic bargaining, typically Nash, determines the terms of trade. However, there are reasons to prefer strategic bargaining. I analyze a bargaining game that is useful in models of liquidity. Advantages include (i) it has simple microfoundations, both in and out of steady state; (ii) it is more tractable than Nash, but the outcomes share interesting features; (iii) the benchmark version is consistent with axiomatic approaches in the literature, while another version is not, but can still be used; and (iv) it is arguably realistic.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:51:y:2019:i:2-3:p:739-754
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