Caution: Do Not Cross! Distance to Regulatory Capital Buffers and Corporate Lending in a Downturn

Cyril Couaillier, Marco Lo Duca, Alessio Reghezza () and Costanza Rodriguez D'Acri

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2025, vol. 57, issue 4, 833-862

Abstract: While banks are expected to draw down regulatory capital buffers in case of need during a crisis, we find that banks kept at a safe distance from regulatory buffers during the pandemic by procyclically reducing corporate lending. By exploiting granular credit register data, we show that banks with little capital headroom above their buffers reduced credit supply and that this behavior was amplified for banks that entered the crisis with larger undrawn credit lines. Affected firms were unable to fully rebalance their borrowing needs with other banks, although public guarantees mitigated banks' procyclical behavior and its real effect at the firm level. These findings raise concerns that the capital buffers introduced by Basel III may not be as countercyclical as intended.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13135

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:57:y:2025:i:4:p:833-862

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