Information Revelation via Takeovers in Correlated Environments

Rudolf Kerschbamer

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1997, vol. 18, issue 1, 55-60

Abstract: This paper studies the informational content of takeover bids in correlated environments and provides an explanation for the empirical result that industry rivals of takeover targets exhibit positive share-price reactions on the announcement of a bid. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Information Revelation via Takeovers in Correlated Environments (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:55-60

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199702)18:1<55::AID-MDE806>3.0.CO;2-3

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