Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two‐Tiered Boards

Benjamin Balsmeier, Achim Buchwald and Alexander Dilger ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2015, vol. 36, issue 3, 158-176

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of executive turnover on two‐tiered boards, emphasizing the monitoring role of supervisory board members with simultaneous outside directorships. Based on a unique sample of executives from large German firms, we find that outside supervisory board members generally increase executive turnover at the firms they monitor. This influence is especially pronounced when outside supervisory board members are simultaneously active as managers themselves and capital control is rather weak. These results suggest that external managers on supervisory boards enhance the monitoring intensity and substitute for weak capital control in the absence of large shareholders. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:36:y:2015:i:3:p:158-176

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().