Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

Martin Kloyer, Roland Helm and Christin Aust

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2019, vol. 40, issue 1, 64-78

Abstract: Moral hazard can hinder both the realization and the effectiveness of research and development (R&D) supply relations. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies investigating the determinants of moral hazard under the specific circumstances of R&D supply relations. Based on a study on 104 cases, this article will help to fill that gap. The results not only confirm information asymmetries as determinants, as predicted by principal‐agent theory, but also reveal surprising effects of additional factors. Thus, we show that the general explanation of moral hazard needs to be adapted to the specifics of a concrete exchange situation.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2980

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:1:p:64-78

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